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ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS AMIDST 
RACIAL STEREOTYPES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE ROLE OF RACIAL BIAS IN BOND 
DECISIONS AND IDEAS FOR REFORM 
LYDETTE S. ASSEFA 
The problems of mass incarceration in the United States and its 
burdens on the economic and social well-being of local communities, 
counties, and states have received increased attention and have spurred 
conversations on prison and jail reform.  More recently, reform efforts have 
appropriately focused on the bond system and the role of pretrial detention 
in fueling jail and prison overcrowding.  The bond process presents a 
unique opportunity for reform because defendants at this stage are 
presumed innocent and, as the Supreme Court has affirmed, these 
defendants possess fundamental rights to liberty and a presumption 
towards pretrial release.  Yet jurisdictions, such as Cook County, Illinois, 
overwhelmingly rely on monetary bonds and other restrictive measures to 
condition or deny a defendant’s release, causing many defendants to 
remain behind bars for months and even years awaiting trial. 
As recent research reveals, the use of pretrial detention 
disproportionately affects black defendants who are more likely to receive 
higher bond amounts and more restrictive conditions than white defendants 
facing similar charges.  Meaningful bond reform, therefore, must address 
the role of racial bias in contributing to disparate detention outcomes for 
black defendants.  Bond decisions are particularly susceptible to implicit 
bias because they often require judges to make quick, on-the-spot, complex, 
and predictive decisions about a defendant’s threat to the community and 
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likelihood to reappear in court.  These decisions occur when judges have 
very limited information about the individual defendant, leading to a 
misguided reliance on racial stereotypes. 
Effective bond reform should include the increased use of unsecured 
bonds instead of monetary bail as a more reliable and less restrictive 
means to ensure the defendant’s return to court and community safety.  
Jurisdictions should also demand more accountability and transparency 
from bond judges by requiring publicly available data on bond court 
practices and jail admissions.  Reform efforts should further require judges 
to undergo training on implicit bias and the proper use of risk-assessment 
instruments to more fairly and accurately evaluate the risks a defendant 
poses if released to avoid relying on inaccurate racial stereotypes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past couple of decades, the United States has imprisoned more 
people, both in real numbers and as a percentage of the total population, 
than any other country.1  As of 2008, the U.S. has 2.3 million people,2 
nearly 1 % of the U.S. adult population, behind bars.3 Despite the 50% 
decrease in national crime rates since the 1990s, the rate of incarceration 
has grown at approximately 3% each year from the early 1990s through the 
early 2000s,4 though in recent years the incarceration rate nationally has 
 
 1 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 6 (2010). 
 2 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (March 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [h
ttps://perma.cc/VE23-LEGG]. 
 3 Mark A.R. Kleinman & Angela Hawken, Fixing the Parole System, 24 ISSUES IN SCI. & 
TECH. 45, 45 (2008), http://issues.org/24-4/kleiman/ [https://perma.cc/CNT7-B4B7]. 
 4 Id. 
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shown early signs of slowing down.5  These persistently high incarceration 
rates strain correctional facilities and stretch state budgets to accommodate 
the enlarging population.6  In a 2012 nationwide study of county jails, 15% 
of responding jails reported that confined jail populations were at or above 
the facility’s capacity at the beginning of the year, and over 40% of the jails 
were operating at over 80% capacity.7 
The impact of mass incarceration on prison and jail facilities is 
exceptionally evident in Illinois and Cook County, in particular.8  Situated 
on ninety-six acres of Chicago’s southwest side, the Cook County Jail is 
one of the largest, single-site jail facilities in the country and as recently as 
2012 has routinely operated at approximately 90% capacity at all times.9  
The issue of severe overcrowding and its attendant impact on jail conditions 
for inmates and the strain on county resources has been documented as 
early as the 1920s10 and has been the subject of decades of litigation in 
federal courts.11  In Cook County, the jail population rose considerably 
from around 8,700 in early 2011 to more than 10,000 at its peak in August 
2013.12  In addition to the human costs of mass incarceration on the social 
and economic welfare of the community, the costs to operate crowded jails 
and prisons are exorbitant.  As of 2017, the estimated cost to taxpayers to 
operate the Cook County Jail was $550 million annually, an average of 
 
 5 DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 2 (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUG6-QNT4]. Bureau of 
Justice researchers note a recent downward trend in the incarcerated population since 2008. 
 6 NATALIE R. ORTIZ, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., COUNTY JAILS AT A CROSSROADS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE JAIL POPULATION AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 8 (2015), http://www.naco
.org/resources/county-jails-crossroads [https://perma.cc/5DFZ-JJVA]. 
 7 Id. at 8–9. 
 8 DAVID E. OLSON & SEMA TAHERI, COOK CTY. SHERIFF’S REENTRY COUNCIL RESEARCH 
BULLETIN, POPULATION DYNAMICS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INMATES IN THE COOK 
COUNTY JAIL 2 (2012), https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context
=criminaljustice_facpubs [https://perma.cc/V7TE-R6QL]. 
 9 Id. at 1–3. 
 10 Id. at 1. 
 11 JOHN P. WALSH, THE CULTURE OF URBAN CONTROL: JAIL OVERCROWDING IN THE 
CRIME CONTROL ERA 9–13 (2013). 
 12 After this unprecedented spike in the jail population, Cook County officials began 
reform efforts and recently released data suggests that these efforts may have had some 
impact in diminishing the prison population, which this paper will discuss in more detail in 
later sections. THE CIVIC FEDERATION, THE IMPACT OF COOK COUNTY BOND COURT ON THE 
JAIL POPULATION: A CALL FOR INCREASED PUBLIC DATA AND ANALYSIS 38 (2017), https:
//www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/report_publicsafety2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWW5-
SB7Y]. 
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more than $61,000 a year per detainee.13  Greater attention to a defendant’s 
access to release from jail and prison can alleviate the ballooning burdens 
of the carceral state. 
The rate at which defendants are eligible for pretrial release 
contributes to this rise in incarceration.  The bond process represents the 
beginning of a defendant’s contact with the criminal court system and 
pretrial detainees make up nearly two-thirds of the total defendants 
confined in jails nationwide.14  As overall incarceration rates increased, the 
share of confined pretrial detainees in jails also rose from 56% of the total 
jail population in 2000 to 63% of the total jail population in 2014.15  Bond 
determinations involve assessments of a defendant’s risk pretrial when the 
defendant is presumed innocent.16  Unlike a judge’s sentencing decision in 
the aftermath of a guilty verdict, bond decisions are unique moments in the 
criminal system in which there is a presumption towards release, sometimes 
explicitly written in the state statute.17  The bond process provides a special 
opportunity to alleviate the problems with overcrowding and mass 
incarceration by reexamining the decision makers’ assessments of the 
defendant’s risks and their decisions about release versus detention. 
A detailed examination of bond decisions across the country is 
important not only to address the burdens of mass incarceration, but to 
address the way that bond decisions fuel racial disparities already evident in 
other areas of the criminal legal system.  Racial inequalities exist at every 
phase of the U.S. criminal legal system.18  Compared to similarly situated 
white defendants, black defendants are more likely to be searched for 
contraband,19 more likely to experience police force,20 more likely to be 
 
 13 Id. at 4 (citing Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council, Quantifying the County 
Adult Criminal Justice Costs in Illinois, December 6, 2016, p. 5, http://www.icjia.state.
il.us/spac/pdf/Quantifying_County_Adult_Criminal_ Justice_Costs_in_Illinois_120616.pdf) 
[https://perma.cc/7GV8-WRZW]. 
 14 ORTIZ, supra note 6, at 5. 
 15 TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 4 (2015). The exact percentage is 62.8%. 
 16 See generally id. at 2–3. 
 17 Id. at 2; see also Illinois Bail Statute, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-4 (West 2013) 
(“All persons shall be bailable before conviction . . .”). 
 18 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial 
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 
(2013). 
 19 Kate L. Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence 
from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON & STAT. 163, 164 (2009). 
 20 Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of 
Force at 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2016). 
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charged with a serious offense,21 more likely to be convicted of serious 
crimes,22 more likely to be incarcerated,23 more likely to receive longer 
sentences,24 and more likely to be sentenced to death.25  Black male 
defendants, in particular, are more likely to receive upward departures from 
the sentencing guidelines and less likely to receive downward departures 
than any other group.26 
As this Article will later demonstrate, these racial disparities exist in 
equal force in the bond system.27  Moreover, the nature of the bond process 
itself is particularly susceptible to racial bias because the type of 
assessments made of a defendant’s dangerousness implicate established 
stereotypes of blackness and criminality.28  In bond decisions, judges must 
quickly consider the risk a defendant poses to the safety of persons in the 
community if released and the likelihood that the defendant will appear for 
future court dates.29  Constrained by an avalanche of cases,30 judges make 
rapid, but complex, predictive decisions about a defendant’s threat to the 
 
 21 Starr & Rehavi, supra note 18, at 7. 
 22 EMILY OWENS ET AL., EXAMINING RACIAL DISPARITIES: CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES 
AMONG INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN SAN FRANCISCO, 18 (May 2017), https://www.law
.upenn.edu/live/files/6792-examining-racial-disparities-may-2017-summary [https://perma.c
c/NAZ7-RUW6]. 
 23 David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 347–83, 347 (2012). 
 24 David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence 
from the US Federal Courts, 44(1) J.L. & ECON 285, 300 (2001). 
 25 Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment: The 
Rosenthal Era, 45 HOUSTON L. REV. 131 (2008). 
 26 Mustard, supra note 24, at 302, 312. The Sentencing Guidelines and Policy 
Statements of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was designed to eliminate sentencing 
disparities and stated explicitly that race, gender, ethnicity, and income should not affect the 
length of an individual’s sentence. Id. at 285–86. A federal sentencing commission 
established guidelines and rules that proscribed a sentencing range that was deemed 
appropriate for each defendant based on his or her offense category. Id. at 289. Yet 
researchers have demonstrated that judges are more likely to depart upward from the 
sentencing guidelines to order longer sentences to black defendants than the maximum 
amount included in the sentencing range and are less likely to order reduced sentences for 
black defendants that go lower than the sentencing range. Id. at 312. 
 27 David Arnold et al., Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, Q. J. ECON., 3 (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.princeton.edu/~wdobbie/files/racialbias.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7Q-AMGY]. 
 28 Id. at 26. 
 29 Id. at 5. 
 30 DANIEL T. COYNE, A REPORT ON CHICAGO’S FELONY COURTS, CHICAGO APPLESEED 
FUND FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, 30 (2007), https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1188&context=fac_schol [https://perma.cc/E36C-SSG3]. This source 
notes that Chicago would need to double the total number of criminal court judges to 
adequately process all the felony cases in the city’s criminal courts. 
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community and his or her reliability to return to court based on very limited 
information using amorphous criteria.31  In many jurisdictions, judges have 
no training to make accurate predictions and have wide discretion in their 
decision-making with little accountability.32  The considerable time 
pressures, limited information available to judges, lack of training or 
oversight, and the nuanced analysis required present potent ingredients for 
racial bias, specifically implicit bias.33 
Research in cognitive psychology demonstrates that implicit biases are 
hidden attitudes and stereotypes that are “not consciously accessible 
through introspection” and can therefore impact a person’s behavior and 
decision-making without the person’s awareness.34  Implicit bias often 
occurs when people are asked to resolve a complex issue with limited time 
and must resort to stereotypes, mental shortcuts, or other rules of thumb to 
quickly solve the issue.35  This cognitive process that relies on mental 
shortcuts or existing schemas is rapid, intuitive, automatic, and 
error-prone.36 Researchers have long demonstrated the persistent 
stereotypes of black people as criminal or threatening, as well as the 
association of black men, in particular, with danger and criminality.37  
Violent crimes, but not nonviolent crimes, are associated more frequently 
with black people than white people.38  In the bond context, where judges 
make on-the-spot decisions about a defendant’s dangerousness with little to 
no interaction with the defendant and minimal accountability, judges 
subconsciously resort to established stereotypes and existing schemas of 
black people as dangerous.39  This subconscious process may contribute to 
more restrictive bond conditions for black defendants. 
This Article will analyze bond practices around the country, with a 
particular focus on Cook County, in order to identify specific reform ideas 
to lessen the burdens of mass incarceration and decrease the racial 
disparities present in bond decisions.  Part I will outline the general 
 
 31 Arnold et al., supra note 27, at 3. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 2. 
 34 Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1129 
(2012). 
 35 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 969, 975 (2006); Kang et al, supra note 34, at 1138. 
 36 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 974. 
 37 Mary B. Oliver, African American Men as “Criminal and Dangerous”: Implications 
of Media Portrayals of Crime on the “Criminalization” of African American Men, 7 J. AFR. 
AM. STUD. 3, 4 (2003). 
 38 Id. at 6. 
 39 Arnold et al., supra note 27, at 2. 
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background, purpose, and practices of bond nationally and within Cook 
County.  This section will further discuss the importance and relevance of 
pretrial detention within the criminal legal system and explore the impact of 
race on bond decisions.  Finally, Part II will identify solutions for reforming 
bond by revisiting how judges assess a defendant’s risk and addressing the 
conditions that contribute to implicit bias in bond decisions. 
I. THE PURPOSES, PRACTICES, AND IMPLICATIONS OF BOND  
A. BACKGROUND OF THE BOND SYSTEM 
The bond court judge establishes the conditions of a defendant’s 
pretrial release by setting bail.40  The judge determines the type of bail to 
issue by assessing the potential risks that arise from the release of that 
particular defendant.41  The three primary objectives of bail are to release 
all but the most dangerous criminal defendants before trial, ensure that 
defendants appear at all required court proceedings, and protect the public 
by preventing future crime.42  This emphasis on promoting safety and 
ensuring future appearances highlights that the judge’s inquiry of the 
defendant’s eligibility for release is forward-focused, reflecting the judge’s 
assessment of the defendant’s potential future actions not a judgment on the 
defendant’s guilt or past conduct.  This prospective inquiry requires a 
multifaceted analysis that, without proper direction and oversight, provides 
fertile ground for implicit bias. 
Courts have commonly recognized a general presumption towards 
release in the absence of contrary findings of the defendant’s risk.43  The 
federal bail statute requires judges to determine the “least restrictive further 
condition” to reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and the 
safety of the community.44  When upholding the constitutionality of the bail 
statute, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized “the fundamental nature” of the 
defendant’s strong interest in liberty.45  This interest ensures that, consistent 
with the Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,” and 
therefore, a detainee may not be “capriciously held” without an “informed 
 
 40 ORTIZ, supra note 6, at 2. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on 
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges 1–
57, 1 (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22511, 2016). 
 43 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (West 2012); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-4 (West 
2013). 
 44 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 45 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
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reason for the detention.”46  In the seminal case on the rights of indigent 
defendants, the Supreme Court concluded that discrimination based on a 
defendant’s poverty is unconstitutional.47  Therefore, a defendant’s access 
to bail, and subsequent pretrial release, cannot be conditioned on the 
amount of money the defendant has to post. 
The general presumption towards release is also reflected in the 
Illinois bail statute.48  Like the federal bail statute, the Illinois statute directs 
judges to impose conditions on the defendant’s release if the additional 
conditions are reasonably necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance in 
court, to protect the public, or prevent the defendant’s unlawful interference 
with the administration of justice.49  Without evidence of a real and present 
threat to the safety of others, the statute states that “all persons shall be 
bailable before conviction.”50  The statute instructs judges to liberally 
construe the section on nonmonetary release to rely upon contempt of court 
proceedings or other criminal sanctions instead of financial loss to assure 
the future appearance of the defendant.51 
Despite these presumptions towards release, the majority of pretrial 
detainees supervised by county jails nationwide are confined in physical 
custody—and not supervised in the community—while awaiting trial.52  In 
a 2015 nationwide survey of county jails, 79% of the defendant population 
supervised by county jails was confined at the time of the survey, whereas 
only 21% of defendants were released and supervised in the community.53  
Yet the vast majority of these pretrial detainees were deemed low risk.54  In 
this survey, 40% of responding county jails reported using a 
risk-assessment tool at the time of the defendants’ booking prior to their 
bond hearing to better understand the public safety risks posed by certain 
defendants.55  Of those jails using the assessment tool, 69% of them 
 
 46 Carlisle v. Landon, 73 S. Ct. 1179, 1182 (1953). 
 47 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17–19 (1956) (invalidating an Illinois law that 
prevented indigent defendants from obtaining trial transcripts to facilitate appellate review, 
stating that, “In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than 
on account of religion, race, or color”). 
 48 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-4. 
 49 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-10 (West 2016). 
 50 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-4 (emphasis added). 
 51 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-2 (West 2013). 
 52 ORTIZ, supra note 6, at 5. 
 53 Id. Jurisdictions use a variety of pretrial supervision measures within the community 
including electronic monitoring, day reporting, treatment programs, and mandatory drug 
testing. Id. at 11. 
 54 Id. at 6. 
 55 Id. 
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reported that half of their jail’s pretrial detainees were assessed low risk at 
booking.56 
These risk-assessment tools consider a variety of factors including the 
severity and nature of the alleged crime, the defendant’s pending charges 
and prior criminal history, and any record of the defendant’s failure to 
appear at past court dates.57  The risk-assessment score is made available by 
members of the court’s pretrial services department during the bond hearing 
to aid the judge in determining the defendant’s release.58  The many factors 
included in the risk-assessment tool underscore the complexity and nuance 
involved in the judge’s predictive decision-making.  This complexity 
highlights the potential for implicit, racial bias because without clear 
direction and accountability, judges are tempted to use stereotypes or 
intuition to short-circuit the complexity required in bond decisions. 
In most jurisdictions, judges determine the defendant’s potential risks 
in a brief and presumptive manner with limited information or oversight.59  
Pretrial release decisions are first made by an assigned bond judge within 
24 to 48 hours after the defendant is arrested and charged.60  Given this time 
frame, the information available to the judge on the defendant’s 
dangerousness is often limited to the arresting officer’s police report and 
the defendant’s prior convictions or pending charges, if any.61  
Additionally, bond hearings last an average of five minutes.62  Among the 
factors judges consider for pretrial release are “the nature of the alleged 
offense, the weight of evidence against the defendant,” potential safety risks 
posed, “any record of prior flight or bail violations, and the financial ability 
of the defendant to pay bail.”63 
In setting the appropriate bail conditions, judges have broad discretion 
and little accountability for their decision-making.64  In some jurisdictions, 
judges can consider more than two dozen factors about the defendant’s 
alleged offense and criminal background, in addition to the screening tool, 
to arrive at their bond decisions.65  Given the many factors and the lack of 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING 
THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 8 (2013). 
 58 See, e.g., Dobbie et al., supra note 42, at 7. 
 59 See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 60 Id. at 5. 
 61 THE CIVIC FEDERATION, supra note 12, at 12. 
 62 Dobbie et al., supra note 42, at 6. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Arnold et al., supra note 27, at 5. 
 65 THE CIVIC FEDERATION, supra note 12, at 13. 
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clarity in how judges weigh each factor, this judicial decision-making 
process lacks transparency, making it difficult to review.  This multi-
layered analysis, truncated by the considerable time pressures and coupled 
with the judge’s broad discretion and minimal accountability, creates a 
powerful cocktail for racial bias. 
As in many other jurisdictions, bond decisions in Cook County are 
made very quickly using a risk-assessment tool.66  Decisions that determine 
a defendant’s pretrial freedom are made in 100 seconds on average.67  On 
July 1, 2015, the Pretrial Services Division of the Chief Judge’s Office 
implemented a risk-assessment tool to guide the bond judge’s 
determination.68  The goal of the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) is to 
evaluate the defendant’s threat to the community and likelihood to appear at 
the next court date.69  The PSA consists of three components: new criminal 
activity, failure to appear, and new violent criminal activity.70 
The Pretrial Services staff interview the defendant and prepare the 
report of the PSA numbers before the defendant’s bond hearing.  When 
requested by the judge at the hearing, the staff call out the defendant’s PSA 
numbers and whether there is a violence flag indicated.71  The PSA includes 
a Decision Making Framework Matrix that uses the defendant’s combined 
scores for new criminal activity and failure to appear to recommend the 
appropriate level of monitoring.72  The different types of monitoring include 
release with no conditions, release with pretrial monitoring, like court date 
reminders, release with required meetings with pretrial services staff 
weekly or biweekly, release with the sheriff’s electronic monitoring, or no 
release recommended.  Based on information from the Chief Judge’s 
Office, 16.7% of felony defendants who were released missed court 
appearances after nine months of using the PSA and 17.9% had at least one 
new felony or misdemeanor charge while awaiting trial during this period.73 
 
 66 SHERIFF’S JUSTICE INST., CENTRAL BOND COURT REPORT 2, 6 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/pdf/20161026/Sheriff_s-Justice-Institute-Central-Bond-
Court-Study-070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y42P-A5TM]. 
 67 Id. Since September 18, 2017, bond hearings have slowed down somewhat due to the 
Chief Judge’s judicial order on money bail that requires judges to explain why cash bail is 
needed. THE CIVIC FEDERATION, supra note 12, at 12. 
 68 SHERIFF’S JUSTICE INST., supra note 66, at 12. 
 69 Id. at 6. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Personal observations by the author at Cook County Central Bond Court on 
September 21, 2017. 
 72 SHERIFF’S JUSTICE INST., supra note 66, at 6. 
 73 THE CIVIC FEDERATION, supra note 12, at 5. 
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In many jurisdictions, the types of bonds issued comprise three 
categories: release on personal recognizance, nonfinancial, and financial 
conditions of bond.74  Release on personal recognizance releases the 
defendant with no conditions after the judge determines the defendant 
presents minimal flight risk and does not pose a real or present threat to 
persons in the community.75  A more restrictive release is the use of 
nonfinancial conditions of bond like court date reminders, electronic 
monitoring, and mandatory drug treatment.76  Financial conditions present 
even greater restrictions on the defendant’s release by requiring a bail 
payment if the judge determines that there is an increased risk that the 
defendant will not reappear in court.77  The defendant is typically required 
to pay 10% of the bail amount to secure release, with most of the money 
refunded after the defendant appears for court, and a portion of the money 
retained by the court clerk as a court fee.78 
For a minority of defendants, judges order no bail based on the 
severity of the crime and the risk the defendant poses to public safety.79  In 
some jurisdictions, there are statutory requirements for the denial of a bail 
bond for defendants charged with first or second-degree murder or other 
violent crimes.80  In these situations, the judge determines that “no set of 
conditions for release will guarantee” either the defendant’s appearance or 
will ensure the safety of the community.81  The number of bond conditions 
available to judges, and the lack of review of the judge’s pretrial monitoring 
decision, give judges considerable discretion.  This discretion makes them 
more susceptible to implicit bias by permitting them to subconsciously 
apply their own conclusions about the defendant’s risks to the community. 
Under the Illinois bail statute, for the defendants designated as release-
eligible—those who do not pose a danger to the public—the statute creates 
two alternatives for pretrial release.82  Judges can order the defendant’s 
release on personal recognizance (I-bond).83  The second alternative is 
monetary bail, where defendants are eligible for release after posting a 
 
 74 ORTIZ, supra note 6, at 7. 
 75 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-4; Dobbie et al., supra note 42, at 5. 
 76 Dobbie et al., supra note 42, at 5. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 5–6. 
 79 Id. at 6. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-2. 
 83 Id. 
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percentage or the entire bail amount as a surety of their return to court.84  In 
these instances, the judge determines that the defendants are not a threat to 
the community and are entitled to release.85 
Despite the statute’s requirement of the least restrictive conditions and 
the variety of nonmonetary release options, traditionally the most prevalent 
form of bond issued in Cook County is financial, deposit bonds.  Cook 
County bond court reports from 1987,86 2005,87 2012,88 and 201789 
document the system’s reliance on deposit bonds for pretrial release, 
requiring defendants to purchase their freedom in the vast majority of cases.  
In the 1987 study, 82% of defendants were required to make upfront 
payments to avoid jail even though only about 23% were charged with 
violent crimes; I-bonds made up only 6% of the cases.90  By 2011, I-bonds 
were ordered in just 8% of the cases.91  That same year, a three-judge 
district court panel in Chicago found that many individuals awaiting trial 
would have been released with small or no cash bail amounts “were it not 
for the unexplained reluctance of state judges in Cook County to set 
affordable terms for bail.”92  The court further found that “overcrowding is 
a primary cause of unconstitutional conditions at the jail” and ordered 
prisoners released to decrease the jail population.93 
 
 84 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110–7(a); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110–8(a). 
 85 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-7. 
 86 CHRISTINE A. DEVITT ET AL., ILL. CRIMINAL   JUSTICE    INFO.    AUTH.,     THE    
PRETRIAL PROCESS IN COOK COUNTY: AN ANALYSIS OF BOND DECISIONS MADE IN FELONY 
CASES DURING 1982–83 37, 45 (1987), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppcc-
abdmfcd8283.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YBZ-RP6W]. 
 87 Bureau of Justice Assistance: Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, 
American University, A Review of the Cook County Felony Case Process and its Impact on 
the Jail Population, 7 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
 88 JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, COOK CTY., ILL., EXAMINATION OF COOK COUNTY BOND 
COURT 3 (2012), https://www.slideshare.net/cookcountyblog/justice-advisory-council-bond-
report-7122012 [http://perma.cc/F2J9-FDRE] (finding monetary bonds comprised two-thirds 
of the detainees in Cook County Jail in 2012). 
 89 SHERIFF’S JUSTICE INST., CENTRAL BOND COURT REPORT 1, 4 (2018), https://www.
cookcountysheriff.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Central-Bond-Court-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PC9Y-5LHP]. Prior to recent changes in the bond process implemented in 
September 2017, judges in Cook County’s Central Bond Court issued deposit bonds over 
half of the time. Id. at 4. Following the recent changes to the bond process, deposit bonds 
decreased in frequency to less than a quarter of all cases, however, the denial of bonds 
altogether increased in this period over tenfold from 0.6% of cases to 7.8% of all cases. Id. 
 90 DEVITT ET AL., supra note 86, at 37, 44–45. 
 91 OLSON & TAHERI, supra note 8, at 5. 
 92 United States v. Cook County, 761 F. Supp. 2d 794, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 93 Id. at 796–97. 
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A 2012 study additionally found that two-thirds of pretrial detainees 
were assigned a monetary bond and the majority remained detained because 
the amount was above what they could afford.94  Deposit bonds continued 
to remain the most common form of bond in Cook County as recently as 
2016.95  In court observations of 1,574 cases in Cook County’s Central 
Bond Court in the spring of 2016, deposit bonds accounted for 56% of all 
bonds issued, followed by 23% of the bonds that required electronic 
monitoring, and 19% were I-bonds.96  During this period, the average 
deposit bond amount was $71,878, and only a quarter of all defendants who 
were issued a deposit bond posted bond within thirty-one days of being 
booked in the Cook County Jail.97  Cook County judges’ long-standing 
reliance on unaffordable deposit bonds to bar pretrial release, even for a 
low-risk defendant, highlights the lack of an individualized inquiry into the 
defendant’s dangerousness and flight risk before setting bail.  A judge’s 
failure or inability to apply a complex analysis in bond decisions invites the 
judge to substitute his or her own abridged analysis or simplistic 
stereotypes to resolve the bond issue. 
B. RECENT CHANGES TO BOND IN COOK COUNTY 
In light of the incongruence between the bail statute’s presumption of 
release and the court’s reliance on unaffordable deposit bonds, the Chief 
Judge of the Cook County Criminal Court issued a judicial order in July 
2017 that reiterates the statute’s emphasis on nonmonetary bonds and 
pretrial release.98  The order aims to ensure that “no defendant is held in 
custody prior to trial solely because the defendant cannot afford to post 
bail.”99  When judges are setting bail, “there shall be a presumption that any 
conditions of release imposed shall be non-monetary in nature and the court 
shall impose the least restrictive conditions necessary to reasonably assure 
the appearance of the defendant.”100  These guidelines became effective on 
 
 94 Justice Advisory Council, supra note 88, at 3. 
 95 SHERIFF’S JUSTICE INST., supra note 66, at 2. 
 96 Id. at 1–2. 
 97 Id. at 1. 
 98 Chief Judge Evans, Circuit Court of Cook County, General Order No. 18.8A —
Procedures for Bail Hearings and Pretrial Release, July 17, 2017, http://www.
cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/2562/
GENERAL-ORDER-NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-Bail-Hearings-and-Pretrial-Release.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TF2Y-WGFL] (last visited on Sept. 13, 2018). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. (emphasis added). 
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September 18, 2017, in all felony cases and January 1, 2018, in all other 
cases.101 
The order primarily mirrors the statutory language but requires judges 
to take additional steps before ordering restrictive bond conditions.  Judges 
must state on the record, along with “sufficient supporting facts,” why no 
other conditions of release besides monetary bail will reasonably assure the 
defendant’s appearance in court and affirm that the amount of bail is not 
oppressive.102  They must also inquire into the amount the defendant can 
afford to pay before determining the monetary bail.103  The order gives all 
defendants a rehearing within seven days to reconsider the bail amount if 
they cannot afford to pay the required amount.104  Prior to this order, 
rehearing was available only to defendants charged with lower-level 
offenses.105  As part of this new policy, the chief judge cleaned house, 
replacing all of the judges in the Cook County Central Bond Court.106  The 
chief judge also created a new Pretrial Division with its own presiding 
judge to oversee the bond court, maintaining its separation from the Circuit 
Court’s criminal division where defendants are tried.107 
These recent changes may have contributed to initial decreases in the 
jail population.  Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart announced a 900 inmate 
decrease in the jail population within the first month and a half of the 
order’s implementation.108  As of November 1, 2017, Dart revealed that the 
general jail population had decreased by 39% since August 2013, dropping 
to 6,200 inmates, the jail’s lowest level since 1988.109  While these 
announcements are positive news, recent data on jail population and bond 
practices in Cook County has been tightly controlled by the chief judge and 
the Cook County Sheriff who have not responded to various research 
requests to publicly review and verify the results.110  Without a complete 
picture of the data it is difficult to determine whether these decreases are 
attributable to other causes, such as changes in arrest or crime rates or the 
prosecutors’ charging decisions.  Furthermore, the reticence of Cook 
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County officials to disclose the raw data raises concerns that it is being used 
selectively and not to measure the policy’s effectiveness.  The lack of 
transparency by Cook County officials to disclose this data contributes to 
the problems of implicit bias by failing to provide the accountability and 
judicial oversight needed to combat implicit bias. 
C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 
The persistence of the current pretrial detention system in county jails 
and prisons has profound consequences for the administration of justice, 
public safety, and the reduction of recidivism. Pretrial detention has a 
devastating impact on a defendant’s access to justice.  Defendants detained 
pretrial are more likely to be convicted and receive longer sentences than 
defendants released pretrial.111  Federal courts as early as the 1970s have 
routinely documented that defendants who are free pending trial “stand[] a 
better chance of not being convicted, or, if convicted, of not receiving a 
prison sentence.”112  Nationwide, detained defendants are 15% more likely 
to be incarcerated compared to released defendants and have prison 
sentences that are 264.6 days longer on average.113  The heightened risk of 
conviction is even more pronounced for defendants deemed low risk who 
are detained pretrial.  Low-risk defendants detained for the entire pretrial 
period are 5.41 times more likely to be sentenced to jail and 3.76 times 
more likely to be sentenced to prison when compared to low-risk 
defendants released pretrial.114 
Studies have additionally found that a defendant’s success at trial 
correlates with the amount of time the defendant is detained before release.  
Defendants detained for the entire pretrial period were 4.44 times more 
likely to be sentenced to jail or prison compared to defendants who were 
 
 111 Alissa Ackerman & Meghan Sacks, Bail and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention 
Lead to Harsher Punishment?, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y. REV. 59, 62–63 (2014); Dobbie et al., 
supra note 42, at 26 (finding that “pretrial release significantly decreases the probability of 
conviction, primarily through a decrease in guilty pleas”); Megan Stevenson, Distortion of 
Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 3 (J. L. ECON. & ORG., 
Forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777615 [https://perma.cc/V88R-2GJQ] 
(finding pretrial detention leads to a 6.2% increase in the likelihood that a defendant will be 
convicted). 
 112 Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Lopez-
Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release at 29 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 3d ed. 2007) which found 
“considerable evidence that pretrial custody status is associated with the ultimate outcomes 
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 113 Dobbie et al., supra note 42, at 12. 
 114 LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 57, at 4. 
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released at some point pending trial, even when other relevant statistical 
controls are considered.115  In light of the hasty manner in which judges 
often make detention decisions and the decisions’ susceptibility to racial 
bias, this link between pretrial detention and higher conviction rates is 
particularly alarming. 
There are various explanations for the disparities in conviction rates 
for pretrial-detained and pretrial-released defendants.  However, several 
courts and research studies agree that pretrial detention overwhelmingly 
disrupts a defendant’s ability to prepare his or her own defense.116  Detained 
defendants are at a considerable disadvantage in identifying exculpatory 
evidence, accessing their defense counsel, and even understanding the 
nature and consequences of the charges before them.117  Prolonged pretrial 
detention additionally impacts the defendant’s bargaining position to 
negotiate an advantageous resolution of the case with the prosecution.118 
Another disturbing factor that contributes to the disparate conviction 
rates for pretrial detainees is the impact of prolonged detention on inducing 
guilty pleas.  Defendants detained pretrial are more likely to enter guilty 
pleas regardless of actual guilt because of the coercive effects of long 
detentions.119  In fact, detained defendants plead guilty twice as much as 
released defendants in order to secure their release.120  Released defendants 
also have access to more favorable plea deals than those detained.121  As a 
result, released defendants are substantially more likely to be convicted of a 
lesser charge and are convicted of fewer total offenses than detained 
defendants.122 
The particularly excessive periods of pretrial detention in Cook 
County not only exert a noxious effect on the defendant’s willingness to 
accept an unjust guilty plea, but also result in incarceration beyond the 
defendant’s sentence.123  In Cook County, the extreme periods of time 
 
 115 Id. at 12. 
 116 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975); Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 781; 
OLSON & TAHERI, supra note 8, at 7. 
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 123 Daily Herald Report, Cook County Jail Population Down About 700 People, DAILY 
HERALD (Jan. 3, 2017, 9:13 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20170103/news/17
0109830/ [https://perma.cc/B9CR-WXXB]. 
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pretrial detainees remain in custody often surpass the sentence the 
defendant would have received if convicted.124  According to Sheriff Dart, 
in 2016, approximately 1,203 pretrial detainees were eligible for automatic 
release after their convictions because they had already served their entire 
sentence waiting for trial.125  Moreover, a number of these defendants 
remained behind bars for periods longer than the term of their sentence, 
causing what Dart calls “dead days.”126  In 2015 alone, these “dead days” 
totaled nearly 80,000 days or 218 years that defendants served in excess of 
their eventual sentences while awaiting trial.127  In 2016, the number of 
dead days rose to a total of 251 years of excess time served.128  As a result, 
the use of pretrial detention strips the defendants of their liberty not merely 
for the period of time they are presumed innocent, but for months and years 
beyond the terms of their punishment.  The temptation for judges to resort 
to racial stereotypes to quickly resolve complex bond decisions is 
exceptionally distressing given the excessive and disproportionate periods 
of pretrial incarceration and rates of conviction. 
A further consequence of a monetary bail system that conditions 
pretrial release on a defendant’s access to funds is an increase in recidivism.  
Researchers have found a strong correlation between pretrial detention, 
even for a few days, and higher rates of crime committed by those 
defendants during the pretrial period and for years after the resolution of 
their criminal cases, particularly for low and moderate-risk defendants.129  
Low-risk defendants detained for the entire pretrial period are 1.3 times 
more likely to commit new crimes in the years following case disposition 
than defendants released at any point before trial.130  Defendants detained, 
even for a few days while gathering funds to post bail, are 1.39 times more 
likely to recidivate in the pretrial period than defendants released within a 
day.131 Researchers find that recidivism rates for low and moderate-risk 
defendants increase considerably as the length of pretrial detention for a 
defendant increases up to 30 days.132  In Cook County, the rate of 
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recidivism is alarmingly high for defendants detained pretrial.133  Half of 
the defendants detained until their conviction and sentencing returned to jail 
within three years.134 
The causes of recidivism are multifaceted and complex, but 
researchers have studied the destructive effects of pretrial detention in lost 
employment, strained family relationships, economic hardship for the 
defendant and his or her dependents, and the loss of access to health care 
and social services.135  Pretrial detention further destabilizes the lives of 
already vulnerable defendants unable to post bail and alienates them from 
family, friends, and other resources of support.136  Resource deprivation and 
alienation from their communities can make defendants more susceptible to 
illicit activity.  Pretrial detention additionally disrupts an individual’s access 
to health care and social services which are often not adequately provided 
in county jails, and reconnecting defendants to community services can be 
difficult after their release.137 
Pretrial detention also lowers a defendant’s ties to the formal labor 
market.138  A defendant’s release pretrial increases the probability of 
employment in the formal labor market by nearly 30% for three to four 
years after the bond hearing, and the probability of any formal sector 
income increases by 8.5 percentage points over this time period.139  Indeed, 
detained defendants suffer an average of $30,000 in lost earnings and 
government benefits alone because of their detention.140  The use of pretrial 
detention exacts a considerable and disproportionate financial toll on racial 
minorities and economically at-risk defendants, many of whom already lack 
the necessary funds to purchase their freedom in the first place. 
 
 133 David E. Olson & Sema Taheri, Characteristics of Inmates in the Cook County Jail, 
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D. RACIAL BIAS IN BOND DECISIONS 
The use of pretrial detention does not impact all defendants equally, 
and the disparate impact of pretrial detention suggests the existence of 
racial bias in bond decisions.  Black defendants are 3.6 percentage points 
more likely to be assigned monetary bail than white defendants, even after 
controlling for the severity of the offense, the number of felony charges, 
and the defendant’s criminal history. 141 When assigned monetary bail, 
black defendants receive bail amounts that are nearly $10,000 greater than 
white defendants with similar offense characteristics on average.142  
Additionally, black defendants are 2.0 percentage points less likely to be 
released on their own recognizance and 1.6 percentage points less likely to 
receive non-monetary bail with conditions than white defendants.143  
Consequently, black defendants are 2.4 percentage points more likely to be 
detained pretrial compared to white defendants with the same type of 
offense.144 
Black defendants are detained pretrial at higher rates, yet research has 
found that white defendants are more likely to be rearrested for new crimes 
committed during the pretrial period, providing convincing evidence of 
racial bias against black defendants in bond decisions.  Marginally released 
white defendants are 22.2 percentage points more likely to be rearrested 
prior to case disposition than marginally released black defendants.145  The 
higher arrest rates for white defendants transcend all crime types.146 
Marginally released white defendants are 8 percentage points more likely to 
be rearrested for a violent crime, 4.7 percentage points more likely to be 
rearrested for a drug crime, and 16.3 percentage points more likely to be 
rearrested for a property crime prior to case disposition than marginally 
released black defendants.147  The significant incongruity between release 
rates and rearrest rates for black and white defendants suggests that judges 
are likely racially biased against black defendants and highlights the 
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inaccuracies in the current risk-assessment system at the expense of black 
defendants. 
Racial disparities in pretrial detention also persist in Cook County.  
Like in other areas of the criminal legal system, black people are 
significantly overrepresented in the Cook County Jail population.  As of 
April 2017, 73% of the people incarcerated in the Cook County Jail were 
black, yet black people make up only 25% of Cook County’s population.148  
Within the context of pretrial detention, black defendants are released at 
substantially lower rates than non-black defendants charged with the same 
crimes—only 15.8% of black defendants in Chicago charged with Class 4 
felonies were released on bond compared to 32.4% of non-black defendants 
with Class 4 felonies.149  Along with the greater difficulties minority 
defendants experience procuring their freedom before trial, they are also 
more likely to face longer periods behind bars awaiting trial and 
disproportionately represent the defendants detained the longest at Cook 
County Jail.150  Of the individuals detained for more than two years in Cook 
County Jail awaiting trial, 93% are racial minorities.151  Consequently, 
black and other minority defendants in Cook County disproportionately 
experience greater barriers to pretrial release in the first instance and greater 
incarceration periods as they await trial than their white counterparts.    
II. IDEAS FOR REFORM 
In light of the racial disparities, the bloated incarcerated population, 
and the grave consequences of pretrial detention on equal access to justice, 
it is essential to explore ideas for effective bond reform.  While Cook 
County still relies on monetary bail for defendants deemed release eligible, 
other jurisdictions have rejected monetary bail for more reliable and less 
restrictive means to ensure defendants’ return to court.152  Studies 
 
 148 Sharlyn Grace, Principles of Bail Reform in Cook County, CHICAGO APPLESEED (Apr. 
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demonstrate that unsecured bonds are equally as effective as secured bonds 
to achieve court appearances.153  The District of Columbia is a model bond 
court system because it has virtually eliminated monetary bail.154  The 
District employs a comprehensive and long-established supervised release 
system, releasing approximately 85% of arrestees pretrial.155  Of all 
arrestees, nearly 90% return to court for subsequent hearings.156  In the first 
nine months of fiscal year 2015, only 9% of released defendants in D.C. 
were rearrested for new crimes.157  In Kentucky, failure to appear rates 
remained constant or decreased when the court system stopped relying on 
money bail and adopted a more rigorous risk assessment and pretrial 
services system.158  A Colorado study demonstrated that a simple reminder 
call to defendants reduced failure to appear rates from 21% to 12%.159  A 
Nebraska study revealed that even postcard reminders noticeably reduced 
failure to appear rates.160  Multnomah County, Oregon experienced a 41% 
decrease in the court system’s failure to appear rates by using automated 
call reminders.161 
These alternatives to monetary bail not only encourage more pretrial 
release, decrease the incarcerated population, and minimize the significant 
disruptions of pretrial detention for defendants and their families, but these 
alternatives are also considerably more cost-effective. In Washington, D.C., 
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compared to about $200 per day to detain that individual in jail.162  
Similarly, a 2010 study found that Broward County, Florida spent an 
estimated $107 per day to detain each individual pretrial whereas the cost of 
providing pretrial services was only $1.48 per person per day.163 
Along with alternatives to monetary bail, another needed reform is 
ongoing judicial oversight and accountability of bond judge decisions.  As 
research on cognitive psychology demonstrates, implicit bias often occurs 
when decision-making happens with significant discretion and no 
accountability.164  Within Cook County, there is evidence that some judicial 
oversight improves bond outcomes.  Following the record spike in the Cook 
County Jail population in September 2013, the Cook County Board 
President Toni Preckwinkle wrote a letter to the Illinois Supreme Court 
justices requesting help with the county’s criminal case processing times, 
pretrial services, and the use of probation.165  The letter referenced other 
jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania and New York City, where state high 
courts have intervened to address court system problems.166  In response, 
the state supreme court convened an unprecedented meeting with its seven 
members and Cook County criminal justice leaders, including the chief 
judge, sheriff, state’s attorney, public defender, and the circuit court 
clerk.167 
Available data suggests that the supreme court’s intervention had an 
immediate positive impact on bond court orders, though the link cannot be 
conclusively proven.168  From September 2013 through May 2017, the 
number of I-bonds and electronic monitoring orders increased from 
approximately 13% to 47%.169  This meeting also prompted regular 
meetings of what is now called the Stakeholders Committee, comprised of 
key staff members at each of the aforementioned agencies, to address 
criminal court issues on an ongoing basis.170  These developments 
underscore the important role of judicial oversight and leadership to 
improve the bond process. 
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To ensure this accountability on an ongoing basis, bond courts in each 
jurisdiction should update and publicly share information on bond court 
practices and jail admissions disaggregated by race.  Implicit bias thrives 
without accountability and oversight.  Taxpayers and county residents 
should know how the court system administers its bond decisions in the 
name of public safety, and meaningful reform is not possible without a 
comprehensive picture of the bond process.  The Office of the Chief Judge 
of the criminal court should maintain a dashboard on the court’s website 
with regularly updated information on bond court orders, release results, 
failures to appear, and rearrest rates disaggregated by race, age, gender, and 
offense type, and anonymously linked to each judge.171 
Regular reports from the sheriff’s office are also critical to system 
accountability.  The sheriff’s office should post daily reports on its website, 
tracking the demographic and offense characteristics of detainees, their 
bond, and their length of stay in jail.172  In addition to daily reports, the 
sheriff’s office should release regular dashboard reports on trends in the jail 
population over time such as the number of defendants on electronic home 
monitoring, the percentage of defendants with monetary bonds, the average 
bond amount for the defendants who cannot post, and the defendants denied 
bond—with each number disaggregated by race, gender, age, and offense 
type.173  Beginning in 2009, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office released 
regular reports analyzing jail demographics and trends.  However, these 
reports ended in 2013 at a time when the jail’s population peaked.174  The 
Sheriff’s Office published the Central Bond Court Report that compares 
data from a four-month snapshot in 2016 and 2017.175  This data tracks the 
overall offense type and bond type for all defendants and anonymously 
compares bond decisions of different judges based on the bond orders 
issued.176  However, this report fails to disaggregate the data by race and 
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other demographics to detect bias.  Cook County data cited in this Article 
has come largely from organized court watching by advocates.177 
Along with publicly available data and alternatives to monetary bail, 
comprehensive bond reform should include more training and on-the-job 
feedback for bond judges to decrease racial disparities and improve 
accuracy in risk assessments.  Recent studies on racial bias demonstrate that 
inexperienced judges have consistently higher rates of racially biased 
prediction errors in pretrial risk assessments compared to more experienced 
judges.178  Bail judges make racially biased prediction errors by improperly 
relying on anti-black stereotypes and representative-based thinking which 
leads to the overdetention of black defendants at the margins of release.179  
Prediction errors in favor of excessive detention often occur when judges 
make upward departures from the risk-assessment recommendations to 
impose more restrictive conditions, a process that mirrors the upward 
departures judges make when sentencing black defendants after 
conviction.180 
Given the higher pretrial release rates for white defendants despite 
their higher probability for rearrest, judicial training on the role of implicit 
bias and the correct use of risk assessments and other pretrial information is 
critical.  Most jurisdictions lack judges trained to use risk-assessment 
instruments.181  A proper training should include instruction on how to 
appropriately incorporate a risk-assessment instrument into the judge’s 
decision-making and an opportunity for the judges to review the trends and 
statistical analysis of their own release decisions broken down, at the 
minimum, by race, gender, age, and offense type.  The availability of this 
data for judges to review could help reinforce judges’ awareness of implicit 
bias, and the understanding of demographic trends in their release decisions 
could empower them to think more critically about their decision-making 
processes. 
A corollary of additional training is the requirement that all bond 
judges be full-time bond court specialists, not part-time generalists.  Racial 
bias against black defendants is greater for part-time, less experienced bond 
judges compared to full-time judges.182  In Philadelphia, judges are full-
time specialists who are able to set bail 24-hours a day, seven days a week, 
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and hear an average of 5,253 cases a year.183  In contrast, Miami bail judges 
are part-time generalists who serve as trial court judges on weekdays and 
assist the bond court on weekends; these judges hear only 179 bail cases 
each year on average.184  Reflecting the research findings on racially biased 
error rates, the part-time bail judges in Miami with less bond court 
experience have much higher rates of racial bias.185  Part-time, 
inexperienced judges are more likely to rely on mental shortcuts or 
established stereotypes to assist them in their decision-making.186  In Cook 
County, the chief judge’s decision to create a separate Pretrial Division with 
a new group of judges is a step in the right direction to improve bond 
outcomes.  However, this staffing change should also include judicial 
training. 
Before judges receive training to properly administer risk assessments, 
jurisdictions should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the use and 
effectiveness of the risk-assessment instrument and report their findings.  
These tools prescribe the release conditions for defendants but have largely 
been unstudied.  Since the PSA was introduced in Cook County in July 
2015, there have been no comprehensive reports examining the tool’s 
effectiveness.187  The Administrative Office of the Illinois Supreme Court 
has announced its plans to evaluate the PSA tool and study its use in Cook, 
McClean, and Kane counties but has not determined whether the findings 
will be made public.188  The high court’s involvement and supervision in 
bond court reform is critically important but should be transparent.  A 
publicly available report on the effectiveness of risk-assessment tools lends 
greater transparency and integrity to the bond process and can inspire 
improvements to the tools to ensure their objectivity and mediate the effects 
of implicit bias. 
CONCLUSION 
In an era of mass incarceration and the growing burden of jails and 
prisons on state and local resources, analysis of a defendant’s access to 
pretrial release is an essential component to comprehensive criminal justice 
reform and a means to alleviate jail overcrowding.  Numerous state and 
federal statutes presume pretrial release for all but the most dangerous 
criminal defendants, and the U.S. Constitution requires a presumption of 
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innocence for defendants held pretrial; yet most jurisdictions, including 
Cook County, overwhelmingly rely on monetary and other restrictive 
conditions to detain defendants pretrial. 
A deeper analysis of pretrial detention practices reveals significant 
racial disparities. Black defendants are more likely to be detained pretrial 
despite having lower rates of rearrest compared to white defendants with 
similar criminal backgrounds and offense characteristics. Bond decisions 
are particularly ripe for implicit racial bias because judges often make 
highly technical and nuanced predictive decisions about a defendant’s 
future risk to the community and likelihood to appear in court with very 
limited information about the defendant, little time to make the decision, 
minimal accountability, and broad discretion. Given this dynamic, judges 
are susceptible to mental shortcuts to quickly determine a defendant’s bond. 
These mental shortcuts or rules of thumb subconsciously rely on racial 
stereotypes, leading to more restrictive conditions for black defendants. The 
disproportionate pretrial detention of black defendants has devastating 
effects on their ability to adequately defend against their criminal charges 
causing higher conviction rates for detained defendants and greater 
disruptions to formal sector employment, medical care, social services, and 
their ability to care for their dependents and other family members. 
The bond process is a critical phase in the criminal justice system yet 
the tools and methods employed to ensure public safety and the defendants’ 
return to court are inaccurate, counterproductive, and racially biased. 
Strategic and comprehensive bond reform that includes transparency, 
objectivity, and judicial training and supervision can help reduce 
recidivism, depopulate jails and prisons, mitigate implicit bias, and ensure 
equal access to justice for all defendants. 
 
